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A b s t r a c t
There have been long running disputes on the relationship between the degree of openness and
economic performance. Based on cross-country analyses, a number of studies found that the relationship
between openness and economic performance is quite mixed.  Some studies discovered a positive
relationship, while others found a negative or simply neutral relationship.
Unlike previous studies using cross-sectional data, this study uses structural vector auto-regression
(SVAR) to explore the impact of trade openness and financial openness on the Indonesian economy. The
findings shows that trade openness and financial openness have negative impacts on output. The results
of trade openness are quite robust; since a lack of preparation to anticipate trade openness weakens the
competitiveness of Indonesian products relative to foreign products and, finally, lower output. The findings
of financial openness are also robust because greater financial openness leaves the Indonesian economy
more vulnerable to capital reversal, which endangers economic performance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since more than a century, the relation between openness and economic performance
has been the topic of dispute among policy makers, politicians and academia. In view of
comparative advantage theory of Hecksher-Ohlin, openness can be beneficial in improving
economic performance of a country. Based on this theory, a country will export products having
comparative advantage and import goods having no comparative advantage and this will lead
to increase efficiency thus will support national economic growth. Besides, openness will enhance
the capital inflow to a country and thus will accelerate capital accumulation and transfer
technology which is considered the main components in strengthening the economic growth
as defined by endogenous growth theory.
In the opinion of those who are against liberalization, protection is believed to be able to
enhance economic performance of a country. According to them, the lack of readiness of a
country will aggravate its economic situation, due to its incapability in competing with the
goods and services provided by the developed countries. Krugman (1994) and Rodrik (1995)
are economists with skeptical attitude towards the impact of openness to a country. The question
regarding the benefit of openness to a country»s economy has been raised again since the
economic crisis occurred in South American countries in 1980s and 1990s as well as the one
occurred in Asian countries in 1997/1998. Openness will cause a country to be more vulnerable
towards shock coming from outside country as well as towards the incapability in competing
with developed countries.
Like other countries, Indonesia has faced various problems in its economy especially in
relation with the impact of openness. Trade openness through export import transactions has
succeeded in supporting economic growth. The capital inflows through foreign direct investment
had also enhanced the economic growth of Indonesia during the period of end of 1980s to
1996. During that period Indonesia»s annual average growth reached 8 percent and this had
made Indonesia as one of the developing countries with highest growth rate (Asian Tigers) and
Indonesia had always been the case study of a country with a success in implementing
liberalization.
Economic openness was the cause of the fall of Indonesian economy at the time of the
crisis in 1997/1998 and the impact of this crisis still exists up to now. Economic crisis originated
from foreign exchange crisis has disturbed the structure of Indonesian economy as shown in a
deep economic contraction in 1998. This crisis has given impact not only to the economic
aspect but to social aspect as well. Compared to the other Asian countries also touched by this
crisis, such as South Korea and Thailand, who, after crisis,  have reached above potential economic
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growth of 8 percent, Indonesia still has to face a growth of 4 to 6 percent., which has led to an
increase in poverty and unemployment.
Based on this background, this paper will analyze the impact of openness to the Indonesian
economy. Following this introduction, section 2 will give a brief description on different theories
concerning the impact of openness to the economy, which will be followed by section 3 that
will give a general description of Indonesian economy especially those related to the impact of
openness. Section 4 will give a description on the data and methodology of the research which
will be followed by section 5 that will show the empirical results. The last section of paper will
be conclusion.
II. THEORY
The benefit of openness to a country»s economy has been discussed since more than a
hundred years in the theory of international trade. As Pioneer, Adam Smith initiated theory of
international trade with the famous book entitled the wealth of nations. The openness through
international trade will support a country in being more focused in producing goods with
comparative advantage and importing goods considered more expensive if produced locally.
This will be more efficient to the country. In view of theory of comparative advantage, openness
will give a positive impact on a country»s economy.
After the Second World War, openness through international trade was not popular in
developing countries. Having just released from colonization, openness in international trade
would cause goods and services offered by developing countries failed in competing with those
produced by developed countries. Developed countries produced goods and services efficiently
by using advanced technologies, while developing countries produced goods and services more
expensive due to limited technologies. During these periods, protectionist theories become
dominant and for decades the majority of developing countries implemented industrialization
policies based on a very limited degree of international openness (Edwards, 1993).
Protection against imported goods or frequently known as import substitution policy is
meant to protect locally produced goods so that they will be able to compete with imported
goods. The belief on the importance of protection was introduced by Presbich (1950) and
Singer (1950) with two considerations: First, the steep fall of raw material and its derivatives
during the inexistence of industrialization will create a wider gap between developed countries
and developing countries. Secondly, for industrialization, developing countries will need
temporary assistance such as protection from the goods produced by developed countries.
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The opinion of protection or limiting openness was widely implemented during the period
of 1950s, 1960s and 1970s in developing countries especially the South American countries.
Politicians in those countries always considered that protection would accelerate the economic
growth. However, academia doubted the inward oriented policy. In their opinion, protection
would cause economic distortion due to misallocation of resources which caused inefficiency
of the economy and finally could impede economic activities. Nevertheless, this theory was not
popular in 1960s and 1970s.
Economic performance of the South American countries implementing the inward oriented
policies showed a less satisfying development compared to the East Asian countries that had
aggressively implemented outward oriented strategies. During the period of 1970s until the
mid of 1990s, those East Asian countries or often mentioned as Asian Tigers consisting of
South Korea, Taiwan, Hongkong, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, had had an
impressive growth. The average economic growth in those Asian Tigers during the period of
1965 √ 1980 reached 7.2% and during the period of 1980 √ 1989 reached 7.9%, while the
growth of South American countries only reached 6 % during the period of 1965-1980 and
1.6% during the period of 1980-1989 as shown in Table III.1.
Table III.1
GDP Growth and Exports in Latin America and East Asia: 1965 √ 1989
I. Selcted Latin American Countries
Argentina 3.5 -0.3 4.7 0.6
Brazil 8.8 3.0 9.3 5.6
Chile 1.9 2.7 7.9 4.9
Columbia 5.8 3.5 1.4 9.8
Mexico 6.5 0.7 7.6 3.7
Peru 3.9 0.4 1.6 0.4
Venezuela 3.7 1.0 -9.5 11.3
Latin America (Average) 6.0 1.6 -1.0 3.6
II. Selected East Asian Countries
Hongkong 8.6 7.1 9.5 6.2
Indonesia 8.0 5.3 9.6 2.4
Korea 9.6 9.7 27.2 13.8
Malaysia 7.3 4.9 4.4 9.8
Singapore 10.1 6.1 4.7 8.1
Thailand 7.2 7.0 8.5 12.8
East Asia (Average) 7.2 7.9 10.0 10.0
1965-80 1980-89 1965-1980 1980-89
Annual Rate of Growth Annual Rate of Growth
of Real GDP of Export
Source: Edward (1993)
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The above empirical data shows the performance of countries implementing international
trade openness is far better than those believing otherwise. The four tigers of Asian countries,
South Korea, Taiwan, Hongkong and Singapore, were primarily exporters of manufacturers,
while the three Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, were still moving
from their primary export bases towards greater reliance on manufactured exports. In additions,
the average export growth of East Asian countries is 10 percent during the period of 1965-
1980 and 1980 √ 1989. South Korea had even reached an increase of 27.2 percent and 13.8
percent during those respective periods. This condition is different from the export development
in Latin America with an average export growth of -1.0 percent during the period of 1965-
1980 and 3.6 percent during the period of 1980 √ 1989.
Several facts on those East Asian and Latin American developing countries support the
opinion of economists concerning the advantage of openness to a country»s economy. In line
with these facts, trade reform started to be discussed and implemented widely in developing
countries in 1980s. The policy makers of developing countries started to gradually decrease
trade barriers by implementing trade liberalization.
Lack of Financing for investment had provoked developing countries to open capital
account through liberalization of financial sector. Openness through financial liberalization will
enhance capital inflow for investment and will lead to economic growth. Therefore, the positive
impact of openness to the economic growth of a country can be done through international
trade as well as capital inflow from one country to another. The openness on those aspects will
be very beneficial to the acceleration of economic growth of a country.
The positive relationship between openness and economic growth can be explained by
modern theory of growth, such as endogenous growth theory. This theory argues that saving
and investment accompanied by productive physical capital stocks and human capital (total
factor productivity) plays a key role in accelerating growth of a country. The higher the saving
and investment, the greater the accumulation of capital goods; hence, raising production capacity
of goods and services as well. With the same input, the level of production also multiplies
through higher productivity. The rising productivity is achieved through improvement in
technology and investment in human capital through accumulated knowledge, skills and
individual training. The experiences of developed countries, such as Japan, show that saving-
investment and productivity factor enables them to accelerate their GDP growth.
Through openness, investment originated from capital inflow will increase and this will
certainly support the economic growth. Moreover, trade openness and capital movement will
support a more efficient way in mastering of technology which will lead to increase of productivity
and finally will accelerate the economic growth of a country.
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Meanwhile, Roubini and Martin (1991) and Edwards (1992) pointed out that openness
will increase absorption of technological knowledge from developed world which will finally
accelerate the economic growth of a country (Edwards, 1992). According to Grossman and
Helpman (1989) the other channel of openness to economic growth is the decrease of rent-
seeking. Openness can decrease rent-seeking and therefore can be prevented from resources
allocation and other activities that might impede economic growth. Finally, openness allows
economy to take advantage of economies of scale associated learning by doing (Meier 1989;
Quah and Rauch 1990).
Within the high optimism on the advantage of openness to the economic growth of a
country, there still remain controversies regarding some aspects of trade policies or openness.
Those controversies are related to whether trade liberalization packages have played important
role in the performance of the outward oriented economics. Sachs (1987), for example, has
questioned the premise that trade liberalization is necessary condition of successful outward
oriented strategies. He has argued that the success of the East Asian countries was to a large
extent due to an active role of government in promoting exports in an environment where
imports had not been fully liberalized, and where macroeconomic equilibrium was fostered.
The trade liberalization skeptics include Krugman (1994) and Rodrik (1995). They argued that
the effect of openness on growth is, at best, very tenuous, and at worst, doubtful.
A number of empirical studies found out that the relationship between openness and
economic growth were quite mixed. Some studies found a positive relationship between
openness and GDP growth in developing countries, however there are many studies showed
Table III.2
Study Summary of the Openness Impact on Growth
Alesina, Grilli, and Milesi-Ferretti (1994) 20 1950-89 No effect
Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) 61 1966-89 No effect
Quinn (1997) 64 1975-89 Positive
Kraay (1998) 117 1985-97 No effect
Rodrik (1998) 95 1975-89 No effect
Klein and Olivei (2000) 92 1986-95 Positive
Chanda (2000) 116 1976-95 Positive
Arteta, Eichengreen, and Wyplosz (2001) 59 1973-92 Mixed
Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2001) 30 1981-97 Positive
Edwards (2001) 62 1980s Positive
Number of
Countries
Source: WEO 2001
Years
Covered
Effect on
Growth
Study
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that openness did not accelerate economic growth. Studies were conducted by Roubini and
Martin (1991) and Edwards (1993, 2001) using cross-sectional data the higher degree of
openness lead to faster economic growth in developing countries. Similar studies conducted by
Quinn (1997), and Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2001) had similar results. However, the
studies conducted by Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995), Quinn (1997), and Kraay (1998) showed
that the openness did not have effect on economic growth (Table III.2).
According to Edwards (1998) the inexistence of positive relation due to methodology
limitation, such as ratio between total export and import with GDP cannot be fully used to
measure openness. For example, United States has a lower trade ratio with South Korea, but
actually it has a more open international trade with this country. The measurement for developing
countries, the ratio might be quite satisfying to be used. The measurement of indices or protection
and trade orientation are far from satisfying due to the measurement which was based on
arbitrary (see the detailed explanation on Edwards, 1993). Due to that limitation, there is doubtful
to the positive relation between openness and the economic growth (Edwards, 1998). However
with the stronger link theory between growth and openness, and improvement of measurement
in openness, the result of the research concerning the relation between openness and economic
growth are becoming more robust.
The research carried out by Weinhold and Rauch (1999) with the development of model
of Quach and Rauch (1990) showed that in the less developed countries specialization is positively
and significantly correlated with increased manufacturing productivity growth, even when
variables, such as openness and investment are controlled for. Edwards (1998) has also carried
out a research to see the relation of openness and productivity growth with modern growth
theory. By using 98 countries, he found that more open countries experienced faster productivity
growth. The conclusion of all that experience shows that openness will support the increase of
productivity and finally will support also the growth of economy.
Empirical studies on the relationship between openness and growth were most conducted
based on trade openness. But openness such as explained previously, is not limited to trade
liberalization but also to financial liberalization. The focus of the studies is on trade liberalization
due to its linked to trade in goods and services are essential factor to push economic growth
and capital flows among countries were insignificantly during World War II until the 1970s,
especially capital flow to developing countries grew more slowly. In this period, they consisted
mainly of bank loan. With financial liberalization in the 1980s especially in the developing
countries, financial products experienced rapid growth and capital movement to the country
produced the highest return.  With such development, in 1990s the capital flows to developing
countries developed to become foreign direct investments and purchases of marketable securities
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(portfolio investment). Based on World Bank data, the number of capital inflow to developing
countries in 1991 reached US$ 123.6 billion and it had reached the highest rate in 1997
amounting to US$ 324 billion (Figure III.1).
Figure III.1. Financial flows to Developing Countries
Capital inflows in the form of foreign direct investment will give positive impact to the
economy because it will increase capital stock hence it accelerates economic growth. On the
other hand, capital inflow for short term investment such as portfolio investment could be
dangerous to the economy of the country. A sudden capital reversal will lead to significant
pressures of depreciation towards foreign exchange and subsequently will cause a financial
and economic crisis to the country.
The experience of Latin American countries in economic crisis in 1980s and 1990s as
well as the experience of foreign exchange and financial crisis of East Asian countries, such as
Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea in 1997/1998 were due to capital reversal. Economic
crisis due to foreign exchange as occurred in the East Asian countries has caused a considerable
economic contraction, high inflation rate, as well as the increase of unemployment and poverty.
From social point of view, the crisis has created social unrest and political instability especially in
Indonesia. Development in the countries experiencing economic crisis showed that openness
was not always beneficial to a country. The incapability of a country in controlling external
shock will aggravate the economic condition of the country.
Several latest financial data showed that financial globalization was one of the factors
that provoked financial instability of one country and could gradually give negative impact to
the economic growth of the country. During the era of financial globalization, large number of
US$ Billion
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450 Net Private Flows
Net Official Flows
1991 1992 1997 1998 1999 2000 2003 2004
Source: Global Development Finance, World Bank
231The Openness and Its Impact to Indonesian Economy: A Structural VAR Approach
capital inflows had moved fast and followed the decision of market leader and often this action
was taken without considering the economic fundamental of the country. A slight negative
sentiment coming from the market leader was capable to cause a sudden capital reversal for a
country. The first effect of the capital reversal was pressure on depreciation of foreign exchange
towards rupiah as well as the crisis of balance of payment which had later interrupted the real
economic activities due to the impact of output adjustment. Discussions on negative impact of
capital reversal due to economic openness can read among others in Radelet and Sach (1998),
Montes (1998), and Jackson (1999).
II.1. Trade and Financial Openness in Indonesia
The degree of openness or globalization could be seen from the international trade and
services and the capital movement between countries. International trade and services can be
seen from the current account while capital movement can be seen from the capital account in
the balance of payment. Therefore openness can be seen from the trade policies and international
financial policies, reflected from the foreign exchange and exchange rate policies. In order to
explain the openness in details, we will discuss trade policies and foreign exchange and exchange
rates policies in Indonesia.
II.1.1. Trade Policy
Until 1970s, the trade policy in Indonesia was filled with restrictions on international
trade and even in early 1970s quantitative restriction was still implemented. Trade openness
has significantly increased since the period of new order government. After taking over the
government, the new order administration lowered tariff rate and abolished quantitative
restrictions on both exports and imports for several goods, such as automobile tires, in October,
1971.  Nominal protection for the textile goods and wearing apparel industry had been reduced
by almost half to 70 percent in 1971. Collection rates on total imports declined steadily until
1972 because of successive reduction in tariff rates and the growth of duty-free imports by
foreign and domestic investors: the overall collection rate was only 11 percent in 1972, half as
high as in 1969.
After 1973, trade liberalization in Indonesia was faced with several challenges following
the high demand to protect local production from imported products by implementing import-
substitution policy. This policy also was conducted in order to increase employment. These
policies weakened the case for continued import liberalization. The turning point in trade
policy came in February 1974, when the government prohibited the import of finished sedan
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cars to rescue an uncompetitive automobile assembly industry. This measure was the first
significant breach of heretofore solid policy of liberalization. Over the next five year, imports
quotas and bans extended to a few other industrial goods, including newsprint, textiles, and
motorcycles.
The government still imposed quantitative restrictions for major goods after 1980.
Hundreds of products were added to list of imports subject to some form restrictions between
1980 and mid-1985. By 1984, 22 percent (1,154 items) of imports were subject to some form
registration, regulation, quota, or license. As a result, by 1984 the level and the variability of
effective protection had increased significantly over the levels seen in the early and middle
1970s. Study conducted by Pit in 1971 showed that the effective protection for all importable
was 66 percent; a range of negative 13 percent (rice milling) to 701 percent (soap). Negative
effective protection for virtually all exportables, averaging 11 percent, resulted in an average
level of effective protection below the 66 percent average for importation.
According to estimates of government, import-substitution industry received an implicit
subsidy on production of more than 200 percent on average, whereas industries that did some
exporting were effectively taxed at an average rate of 1 percent. By 1985, import substitution
had moved beyond consumer goods into intermediate goods, such as steel, polystyrene, and
industrial chemical. High and uneven protection discriminated in favor of import-substitution
industry and against exportation.
The fall of world oil prices and as the unexpected result of protection against import-
substitution industries, as reflected in the high rate of unemployment and the economic growth
which was lower than estimated, had led the government to implement trade liberalization
since 1986. A trade liberalization package was introduced in October 1986 followed by a series
of liberalizing measures. 544 goods were exempted form import license requirement, restrictions
on certain export lifted. By the end of 1987, the proportion of goods covered by import licensing
had fallen to 22 percent from 32 percent in mid-1976. Major trade liberalization also introduced
in November 1988, January 1989 and May 1991 by eliminating trade restriction.
The indicator of openness in figure III.2 shows that the trend of trade openness in Indonesia
increase. When trade openness2  is still low which is marked by the high protection against
import and export, the trade ratio towards GDP is also low. In 1960, the openness rate of
Indonesia was only 25,9 percent, however since removing trade barriers in 1971 and 1972, the
rate of openness also rose to 35.2 percent and 40 percent respectively.
2 Trade openness is calculated from total exports and imports divided by GDP.
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II.1.2. Foreign Exchange and Exchange Rate Policies
Indonesia has started financial globalization or openness since 1967 and it can be
distinguished into 4 phases according to the foreign exchange system implemented, such as:
a. Controlled Foreign Exchange System (before 1966)
Foreign exchange transactions are fully controlled and supervised by the government and central
bank. Each foreign exchange transaction is subject to the approval of the government, including
export revenues and exchange rates.
b. Restricted Foreign Exchange System (1966-1969)
In 1967 foreign exchange system was liberalized step by step by allowing exporters to keep a
certain percentage of their revenue and to use it for import purpose from foreign exchange
compulsory surrender. Besides, branch office of foreign bank/joint venture bank and national
bank were allowed to do foreign exchange transactions and at the same time laws on foreign
investment were applied easing foreign investors in investing in Indonesia.
c. Semi Free Foreign Exchange System (1970-1981)
Foreign exchange transactions liberalization includes: a) no permit needed for foreign exchange
transaction; b) the obligation of submitting the revenues of export compensated with facilities
to buy foreign reserve; c) no obligation in submitting revenues of export in the field of services,
but banks still had the obligations to sell its foreign reserve to the central bank.
Figure III.2. Real GDP Growth and Trade Openness
in Indonesia (1960-2005)
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d. Free Foreign Exchange System (since 1982)
There was almost no limitation for foreign exchange transaction, which includes: i) no obligations
for exporters to submit the foreign reserve; ii) no obligations for the bank to sell the foreign
reserve to the central bank; iii) no obligations for individuals to buy/sell foreign reserve; iv) no
obligation to report foreign exchange transaction. Financial deregulation implemented in 1988
has also given a greater impact to the openness of international financial market towards
domestic financial market. One of the provisions stipulated that foreign banks were allowed to
open branch offices in several big cities in Indonesia.
Figure III.3. The Development of Foreign Exchange
Systems in Indonesia
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In line with the foreign exchange system, the exchange rate can also reflect the openness
of a country towards financial globalization, for instance fixed exchange rate system was generally
followed by capital control. In the last 30 years, there are 3 exchange rate systems used in
Indonesia, they are: 1) fixed exchange rate system (August 1971 √ November 1978); 2) managed
floating exchange rate system with widened intervention band (November 1978 √ 13 August
1997) ; and 3) floating exchange rate system (14 August 1997 up to present) as shown in
figure III.3.
One of the indicators used to know the rate of financial openness is ratio between the
capital inflows with GDP. According to Figure III.4 the degree of financial openness3  in Indonesia
3 Financial openness is calculated from the total foreign direct investment and portfolio investemen inflow divided by GDP
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has risen since 1990 or since the issuance of comprehensive financial deregulation package. In
1987, the ratio between capital inflows and GDP was only 0.6% from GDP, but 5 years later, in
1992, the ratio increased twice and became 1.2% from GDP and has risen to more than 4
times in 1995 to become 5.1% (Figure III.4).
Figure III.4. Degree of Financial Openness
in Indonesia
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II.1.3. Openness and Economic Development in Indonesia
In the previous section I have explained about the degree of openness in Indonesia. In
this chapter I will continue to explain the relationship between openness and economic
development in Indonesia. As one of developing countries, Indonesia has experienced with the
benefit of openness, however this openness has also been the cause of the continuing crisis of
Indonesian economy. Since its independence in 1945 until 1966, Indonesian economy was still
relatively close, both in view of international trade and finance. The war occurred until 1950 in
the effort of sustaining its independence had destroyed Indonesian infrastructure. After 1950
the government had to face various complicated political problems that needed an important
budget for the construction and the restoration of its infrastructure. The effort of overcoming
the required budget from money printing had caused the hike of inflation rate with an average
annual rate of 115.9 percent during the period of 1950 √ 1966. Even in 1965 the annual
inflation rate had reached 593.7 percent and 635.4 percent in 1966.
The various social and political problems faced by Indonesia were combined with high
inflation rate and a less satisfactorily economic growth. The average economic growth during
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the period of 1950 √ 1966 was only 3.2 percent and even in 1958 there was an economic
contraction of √ 4.1 percent in 1958 and √ 2.2 percent in 1963. In the early 1960s, export
declined while imports increased. As a result, balance of payment deficits led to depletion of
foreign reserves and accumulation of external debt.
The New Administration took over government in 1966 and launched an economic
stabilization and rehabilitation program with major objectives of reducing inflation, providing
adequate supply of basic needs, reconstructing infrastructure and increasing exports. As a
result, Indonesia»s GDP increased at average annual rate of 6.8 percent during the five year
period since 1967. The inflation rate experienced a declined from 635.4 percent in 1966 to
112.2 percent in 1967 and to only 4.4 percent in 1971. Export increased by 64 percent from
US$ 714 million in 1966 to US$1,173 million in 1971.
To accelerate economic growth and to alleviate poverty, government began with the
launching of a series of five year development Plans starting from fiscal year 1969/1970. Despite
to alleviate poverty through accelerating growth, the development plans also emphasized the
structural diversification of the economy to reduce dependence on oil and natural gas. In the
1970s and early 1980s, the Indonesia economy was dependent on oil revenue. The oil boom
apparently had an enormous influence in increasing Indonesian GDP. The recorded average
GDP growth rate was 7.8 percent a year from 1970 until 1975 and 7.5 percent a year from
1976 to 1981. Inflation, on the other hand, increased in the early 1970s, with the highest
recorded level 40.6 percent in 1974. However, after the implementation of several appropriate
monetary policies and conservative fiscal policies, the inflation rate drastically declined to 6.3
percent in 1979. The average of inflation decreased also from the rate of 18.9 percent a year
during 1970-1975 to 15.0 percent a year during 1976-1981.
Export experienced a sharp increase from US$ 1,173 million in 1970 to US$ 11,020
million in 1978 and US$ 23,565 million in 1981. This sharp increase was influenced by increase
in oil exports which pulled down the share of non-oil exports from 63 percent in 1970 to 33
percent in 1978 and to 18 percent in 1981. However, non-oil exports showed remarkable
increase from US$ 739 million in 1970 to US$ 3,659 million in 1978 and US$ 4,331 million in
1981.
The impact of the world recession and the drop in oil prices in the early 1980»s was
subsequently felt the Indonesian economy in 1982. The economy experienced contraction with
growth rate dropped to -0.3 percent in 1982 and the balance of payments continued to
experience deficits due to decrease in the international market price of oil. To cope with the
problems, the government adopted a full deregulation policy. The Government changed its
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policy toward increasing the role of the private sector in accelerating economic growth, in
particular, increasing non-oil exports. To achieve this objective, it was felt that suitable climate
should be created to promote initiative, competition and increase efficiency trough deregulation
and liberalization economy.
This deregulation was taken in a sequence, started deregulated the foreign exchange
market in 1982, then, led by further fundamental deregulation in the monetary and banking
sectors in 1983. Those deregulations were followed by deregulation in the financial, monetary
and banking sectors in 1988 and capital market deregulation measures were taken in 1987,
1988 and 1990. As part of deregulation, banks were given more freedom in accepting deposits,
including saving accounts in 1989. Deregulation also gave more openness to foreign bank to
open their branches in the big cities in Indonesia.
A fundamental deregulation has succeeded in supporting the increase of domestic saving
which created a high raise in the financial sources for investment. The economic growth had
shown an important increase especially after the implementation of comprehensive deregulation
package in 1988. Financial deregulation as well as economic openness to the outside world
had enhanced financial sources for investment coming from local and foreign investors. The
average rate of economic growth during the period of 1989 √ 1996 reached 7.3 percent and it
reached its highest point in 1995 with 8.2 percent. This raise had been accompanied by the
increase of supplies which had impeded the hike in inflation rates. During that period the
inflation rates stayed at 8.1 percent.
Openness had put Indonesian economy in a vulnerable situation towards capital
movement. Capital inflows to Indonesia could be seen from foreign direct investment as well
as portfolio investment including Securities such as Bank Indonesia»s Certificate, Treasury note
and stock. Portfolio investment was actually vulnerable to the balance of payment and foreign
exchange rates. Investors were very interested to this type of investment since the launching of
the deregulation package in financial sector and since the implementation of financial openness
to the outside world since 1988.
Economic crisis happened in 1997/1998 was actually originated from capital reversal in
the form of portfolio investment. The crisis triggered by the crisis of foreign exchange rates had
rapidly changed into economic crisis, social crisis and cultural crisis as well as political crisis. The
main cause of foreign exchange and monetary crisis was the speculation attack towards Thailand
currency which then spurred on a contagion effect to the depreciation of rupiah exchange rate
due to the fact that investors thought that Indonesian economy was the same as Thailand»s.
The weakness of rupiah exchange rate had caused foreign investor to withdraw their money so
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far invested in the form of portfolio investment, sudch as commercial papers promissory notes,
medium term notes as well as stocks and obligations. Panic attacked the market of foreign
currencies due to the interest of local companies and banks to buy foreign exchange in order to
pay or to protect their big foreign obligations from foreign exchange rate risk.
In its effort of facing the huge pressures towards the depreciation of rupiah exchange
rates, the central bank of Indonesia did intervention in selling foreign exchange rate system
since during that period Indonesia used a managed floating exchange rate system.  Bank
Indonesia had to widen this intervention band several times due to the high demand of foreign
currencies. However due to the huge pressures towards the weakening of Rupiah exchange
rates accompanied by the high decrease of foreign exchange reserves, finally the government
had to change the exchange rate system from managed floating to flexible exchange rate
system since August 14, 1997. The monetary crisis had provoked Indonesia to seek for financial
assistance by participating in the program of IMF.
IMF policies in improving national banking soundness by closing unhealthy banks on
November 1, 1997 had created bank runs in almost all national private banks. As stated in the
theory of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) concerning bank runs, bank liquidation without any
time deposit guarantee, such as deposit insurance and blanket guarantee will lead to bank
runs due to lack of confidence of the customers. In order to avoid any destruction in the
banking sector, the government provided blanket insurance to bank customers by paying all
their withdrawals as well as other bank obligations which had certainly led to an exceeding of
money supply. Depreciation of Rupiah exchange rate and the increase of money supply had
created a hike on the inflation rate.
The problems then became more complicated since the monetary and banking crisis had
led to economic and non economic problems. From the economic sector, the structured based
on the conglomeration of big companies with increasing debts originated both from internal
as well as external ones, had created private debt crisis due to huge depreciation of Rupiah
exchange rates. In social sector, the hike of prices, supply shortage and termination of
employment due to economic crisis had considerately created social unrest in several big cities
of Indonesia. In political sector, government reforms occurred several times during the transition
period of democracy which had certainly impeded in focusing at solving crisis problems.
Economic, social and political crisis had significantly disturbed Indonesian economy.
Economic growth was faced by deep economic contraction of √13.1 percent in 1998 that had
put Indonesia as the country with the worst impact of crisis compared to other Asian countries.
Inflation rate showed a huge jump to 77.63 percent in 1998. In line with the gloomy economic
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situation, the number of unemployment rose to 5.5 percent in 1998 compared to 4.7 percent
in the previous year. Five years after crisis, the economic growth of Indonesia still has not
reached its optimal capacity. The average annual growth rate of Indonesian economy during
the period of 1999 √ 2005 was only 4.2 percent with the lowest growth rate of 0.8 percent in
1999 and the highest rate of 5.6 percent in 2005. As real GDP grew below its potential during
the last five years, the rate of unemployment has risen to 10.3 percent in 2005 (Figure III.5).
Figure III.5. Real GDP Growth and
Unemployment Rate
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IV. METHODOLOGY
IV.1. Data
The data being used in this research is a secondary data with a period starting from
1980:1 until 2005:2 according to its availability and its entirety. The data being used include
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the degree of openness (O), interest rate (R), consumer
price index (cpi),  exchange rate rupiah to US dollar (exc), and the number of labor force (emt),
foreign direct investment, portfolio investment,  export, and import. To measure openness,
trade openness (OT) and financial openness (OF) will be used.  Trade openness is calculated
form total exports and imports divided by GDP, while financial openness is calculated from total
foreign direct investment and portfolio investment inflow divided by GDP. Since the availability
of data only comprise of yearly data that leads to a very small degree of freedom for the model,
the frequency of the annual data is transformed into quarterly data using Cubic Spline method
for GDP.
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IV.2. Model
The model that can be used is the structural vector autoregression (SVAR) or the
cointegrated SVAR as proposed by Pesaran and Shin (1997) and Pesaran, Shin, and Smith
(1998). The next step is to create a model of an accounting innovation of impulse response
function (IRF) and forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) using structural vector
autoregression (SVAR) in order to analyze the impact of openness to Indonesian economy.
A cointegrating VAR model is that the model incorporated a cointegration matrix into a
VAR model results in, which, according to Pesaran and Pesaran (1997), can be represented as a
general vector error-correction model (VECM) as follows :
(III.1)
where qt = (xt’ , z t’)’ , xt is a vector of jointly determined (endogenous) I (1) variables, zt is a
vector of  exogenous I(1) variables, wt is a vector of exogenous/deterministic I(0) variables
(excluding the intercepts and/or trends), ut is a white noise vector of error terms, Γix is a short
run matrix of parameters, and Π
x
 is the long run multiplier matrix. The latter can be written
as : Π
x 
= α
x
β’ where β contains the long run cointegration parameters. In this paper, zt and wt
are absent, xt = (gdpt, rt, ot, exct, cpit, empt), and the parameters of concern are the cointegration
matrix. With the ordering of variables in xt as follows gdpt, rt, ot, exct, cpit, empt, β’ can be
written explicitly as follows :
(III.2)
where the augmented elements in the fifth column correspond to the linear trend (t). Taking in
to account (2), (1) is estimated using the maximum likelihood method (see Pesaran and Pesaran
(1997) for details). The resulting vector of residuals (or ≈innovations∆, say εt) is then used for
the VAR analysis. This VAR system may be transformated into a ≈structural∆ VAR model (SVAR)
as follows. Suppose the cointegrating VAR can be expressed as follows :
(III.3)
where Π (L) = I
n
-                  and
Suppose further that et is the error term of the structural model (i.e. an economically
meaningful model) that corresponds to the cointegrating VAR model. The two models relate to
each other through :
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(III.4)
where       and
The cointegrating VAR and SVAR parameters are related through :
AΠi = –Ai for i = 1,2,....,k and AΣA» = Ω This leads to establishment of the following relationship :
(III.5)
Imposing restrictions on appropriate elements of the matrices in (2) permits the
identification structural shocks. These are called contemporaneous restrictions (Amisano and
Giannini, 1997). Though it is possible to impose over-identifying restrictions, since our concern
with this SVAR are not for the elements of A and B but mainly on the subsequent IRF and FEVD
analyses, we heuristically employ just identifying restrictions as follows.
       = bij (III.6)
Where:
aij : element from A
ε j : innovation (error) of variables used by j
             bij : element from B (in this case i=j for i,j  = 1,....,6)
             ej : structural shocks from variable j.
To analyze factors that affect openness on Indonesian economy, the impulse response
function (IRF) and forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) analysis are going to be
conducted. Total variables being used in this research are GDP, degree of openness, interest
rate (R),), total work force (EMT), consumer price index (CPI), and exchange rate rupiah to US
dollar (EXC). Since in the long-run CPI and exchange rate do not have effect to output, the
model restricted the parameter of CPI and EXC to be zero.
Based on ordering results of each variable, it is organized into two models, which is trade
openness model and financial openness model. Variables in small letters indicate that those
variables have been transformed into logarithmic forms, except for interest rate and openness
indicators.
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V. RESULT AND ANALYSIS
V.1. The coefficients of the long-run cointegrating equation
The analysis starts with conducting stationary test to each variable by using Augmented
Dickey Fuller (ADF) test (Verbeek, 2000). With the exception of interest rate, all variables used
in this analysis have non-stationary tendencies I(1) (Attachment 1). Consequently, the structure
of VAR is combined with Vector Error Correction (VECM) or SVAR cointegration in looking at
long-term effect. Therefore, the next analysis for IRF and FEVD is based on that equation.
The first step in estimating SVAR is by testing the optimal order of VAR and cointegration
rank. The results showed that the order of VAR is 3 or VAR(3). Furthermore, the result of
cointegration test showed that there was 1 cointegration rank which meant that in SVAR
model there was one cointegrating equation in the long-run. The model restricted the parameters
of exchange rate and CPI to be 0, since there was no real effect of these variables to the output
in the long-run. The parameter of labor force (emt) is restricted to be -1, since economic
accelerates, the number of labor force decreases in the long run. Restricted long-run cointegrating
equation is called trade openness equation with p-value 0.4279. The long-run equation for
trade openness is as follows:
gdp = -0.14R   –   0.05OT (III.7)
        (0.018)    (0.008)
the number in parenthesis is p-value for each parameter.
The results show that interest rate elasticity is negative and significant, -0.14. The negative
coefficient means that in the long run as the interest rate increases, the economic growth
decelerates; therefore the sign of parameter is in the expected direction and it is in line with the
theory. However, the sign of the coefficient of trade openness is negative and significant, namely
-0.05. The interesting result showed that the openness could endanger the economic growth
of a country. Although there are critiques on methodology to measure openness, such as Edwards
(1998), this result may still robust for Indonesian economy due to inadequate preparation of
the country to openness which could be seen from the failure of  Indonesian goods and services
in competing with those produced by other countries.
Similar steps and restriction are conducted to estimate SVAR for financial openness. The
results showed that the optimal order was 3, and the cointegration rank was 1.  The restricted
cointegrating equation was also called financial openness equation. The p-value of equation
was relatively robust and significant, namely 0.0262. The long-run equation for financial openness
was as follows:
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gdp  =  -0.055R   –   0.057OF (III.8)
              (0.0127)       (0.0094)
the number in parenthesis is p-value for each parameter.
Like trade openness equation, the long-run financial openness equation showed that the
sign of direction of interest rate coefficient was still negative and significant, namely -0.055.
The similar result was found in the coefficient of financial openness. Although the coefficient
was relatively small, however the sign of the direction was still negative and significant. The
result implied that since domestic financial market in Indonesia was becoming more open there
would be more risk that may endanger Indonesian economy. Since the model incorporated
portfolio investment to measure financial openness, the result was realistic to Indonesian
economy. Capital reversal from portfolio investment triggered huge depreciation of rupiah
exchange rate, which then caused hyper inflation, and ballooning external debt4  in term of
rupiah exchange rate. Those factors finally endangered economic growth.
V.2. Forecast error variance decomposition analysis
Since the purpose of the paper is to analyze the impact of openness to Indonesian
economy, the main analysis of this paper will just focus on the analysis of shocks to openness
variables on the variability of GDP, employment, inflation, and rupiah exchange rate. According
to the orthogonalised FEVD results as shown in table III.3, and appendix III.4, shocks to trade
openness are important in explaining fluctuations in GDP, employment, inflation, and exchange
rate.
Fluctuations in the gross domestic product (GDP) in the very short-run and long-run are
predominantly self explanatory. These shocks would explain up to 58 percent in the long run.
The second largest shock that caused variability of gross domestic product was trade openness.
Shocks to trade openness are able to explain approximately 29 percent of long run variability of
the gross domestic product. Shocks to exchange rate and shocks to interest rate can be explained
by just 6 percent and 4 percent of long run variability of the gross domestic product respectively.
Shocks to inflation and shocks to labor force have trivial effects on the variability of the gross
domestic product. The trivial effects of both consumer price index and labor force shocks may
reflect either the possibility that these shocks are actually unable to explain GDP fluctuations,
or that these variables are not good proxy for inflation and employment, or both.
4 Indonesian economy is characterized by huge external debt and the industries that have high dependency to imported input.
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The variability of exchange rate in the short-run and long-run are associated mainly with
its own self. The trade openness shocks have dominant effect in keeping fluctuations in the
exchange rate. Shocks to trade openness can explain approximately 38 percent of long-run
variability of exchange rate. Shocks to interest rate and consumer price index have small effect
in provoking a long-run fluctuation in the exchange rate, while GDP and employment have
trivial effect.
Table III.3
Trade Openness Variance Decomposition
LGDP 1 100 0 0 0 0 0
2 89.13915 0.125681 7.656387 2.165048 0.913731 5.77E-07
5 68.75486 3.338833 21.79006 4.984646 0.445243 0.686352
10 60.53328 3.918815 27.79061 6.304005 0.343535 1.10975
15 58.87557 4.222794 29.32911 6.313865 0.445247 0.813418
20 58.05234 4.229643 29.99894 6.402928 0.399998 0.916155
30 57.14194 4.351058 30.82253 6.475786 0.409104 0.799578
R 1 0.969171 99.03083 0 0 0 0
2 2.063623 72.98599 7.636848 3.984519 13.32893 8.88E-05
5 5.470561 42.65912 19.34319 22.41984 10.06885 0.038446
10 5.148787 42.0328 20.81674 22.79906 8.938771 0.263841
15 4.553728 37.55038 26.96147 20.16298 10.04908 0.722363
20 4.200486 34.88017 29.34558 18.79047 12.0329 0.750386
30 3.661608 31.18961 33.56498 16.64012 14.11192 0.831777
EXC 1 2.361867 0.398958 23.94036 73.29881 0 0
2 1.913719 3.929531 30.35425 62.24583 1.503911 0.05276
5 1.523535 4.410526 36.74859 52.91455 4.006362 0.396441
10 1.169557 3.867829 37.70815 50.5498 6.397754 0.30691
15 1.056306 3.681232 38.11233 49.69221 7.183974 0.273948
20 0.989876 3.536421 38.34769 49.40173 7.480835 0.243446
30 0.920768 3.429793 38.63113 48.90189 7.926146 0.190279
CPI 1 2.112499 1.38519 6.088852 26.31832 64.09514 0
2 3.706483 5.747416 14.65941 30.7642 45.11099 0.011499
5 3.832179 12.87011 33.18317 33.30301 16.36771 0.44382
10 3.851909 13.94733 38.16998 33.24811 10.12359 0.65908
15 3.830773 14.32256 39.0281 33.505 8.849145 0.464418
20 3.839427 14.25963 39.22387 33.62934 8.525388 0.522338
30 3.8348 14.38141 39.6245 33.76965 7.955344 0.434303
EMT 1 0.109493 0.204852 1.215421 4.189655 1.625303 92.65528
2 0.037523 0.826932 1.483313 2.749411 2.799216 92.10361
5 0.020259 2.903353 1.672846 0.703945 6.874118 87.82548
10 0.014783 4.250042 1.717801 0.517853 8.733767 84.76576
15 0.016192 3.901674 1.65913 0.473672 8.380868 85.56846
20 0.013265 4.100991 1.623792 0.364334 8.733967 85.16365
30 0.011158 4.064703 1.608115 0.277599 8.743934 85.29449
 Variance
Decomposition
of:
Cholesky Ordering: LGDP R OT LEXC LCPI LEMT
Period LGDP R OT LEXC LCPI LEMT
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Fluctuations in the consumer price index in the short run explained mainly by its own self,
however in the long run its effect will decrease. In the long run, shocks to trade openness are
predominantly able to explain 39 percent of consumer price index variability. These results are
expected since the greater the degree of openness leads to change supply of goods, then it
triggers the change in the price of goods. The shocks to exchange rate are also significantly
able to explain 33 percent of fluctuations in the inflation, while the shocks of other variables
have small and trivial effect.
The variability of labor force in the short-run and long-run are associated mainly with its
own self, namely 85 percent in long run. The shocks to trade openness have very small to cause
fluctuations in the labor force. Shocks to interest rate and shocks to inflation are just able to
explain 6 percent and 8 percent of long-run fluctuation in the labor force.
Based on variance decomposition for financial model (table III.4), variability of each
macroeconomics variable mostly can be explained by the fluctuation of financial openness.
Fluctuations in output in the short run and long run are explained mainly by its own self,
approximately 90 percent in the short run and 70 percent in the long run.  Instead output own
self, shocks to financial openness are predominantly able to explain 16 percent of output
variability in the long run. Fluctuation in interest rate, rupiah exchange rate, and inflation are
also significantly explained by financial openness. In the long run financial openness will be
able to explain 24 percent of interest rate variability, 38 percent of rupiah exchange variability,
and 35 percent of inflation variability. However, the fluctuation of financial openness is relatively
small to change employment variability.
Table III.4
Financial Openness Variance Decomposition
LGDP 1 100.0000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000  0.000000
2  90.69095  0.075317  3.477025  4.604805  1.145645 0.006256
5 77.83611 4.688831 11.35672 5.116329 0.564998 0.437004
10 70.29557 6.627112 16.25115 5.814556 0.371245 0.640371
15 70.18959 7.055152 16.59247 5.421685 0.261891 0.479214
20 70.98741 6.788930 16.06373 5.374820 0.224685 0.560423
30 71.45105 6.718453 15.88139 5.288157 0.166083 0.494873
R 1 2.023815 97.97618 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
2 2.687487 79.98477 1.157284 7.994857 8.168476 0.007131
5 6.024084 60.10363 10.63125 16.69003 6.483755 0.067263
10 4.787561 64.54075 9.829894 15.59783 5.040198 0.203762
 Variance
Decomposition
of:
Period LGDP R OF LEXC LCPI LEMT
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V.3. Impulse Response Function Analysis
Dynamic movements of each variable due to a one standard error shock trade openness
are analyzed by using orthogonalised  IRFs presented in figure III.6. According to the findings,
shocks to trade openness will lead to lower economic growth. A one standard error shock to
trade openness would decrease output by 0.01 percent in the very short run and by almost
0.02 percent in the long run. As mentioned in FEVD analysis, more openness leads to lower
output due to lack of preparation for trade openness. Furthermore, shocks to trade openness
will lead to an increase in interest rate in the short run, however in the long run it will lead to
lower interest rate. Trade openness leads to an integration of Indonesian economy with world
economy, which is turn lowering the interest rate.
Table III.4
Financial Openness Variance Decomposition (continue)
R 15 4.410863 57.23791 19.65841 13.64419 4.775451 0.273178
20 3.933702 52.74125 24.39246 13.11731 5.237970 0.577308
30 3.125710 51.83270 25.64836 13.18419  5.562858 0.646187
LEXC 1 3.035198 0.001578 31.51974 65.44349 0.000000 0.000000
2 2.794692 5.642360 31.44907 59.40011 0.690835 0.022938
5 2.984107 9.667359 33.39381 49.98918 3.636139 0.329404
10  2.953780 10.84930 36.71570 43.93518 5.245320 0.300724
15 3.018939 11.55739 38.13217 41.18382 5.860080 0.247591
20 2.984563 11.66800 38.42179 40.58459 6.133459 0.207597
21 2.975342 11.69734 38.47224  40.42699  6.224097  0.203991
 30  2.972858  11.84015  38.90593  39.63175  6.496176  0.153146
LCPI 1 2.728679 0.584271 9.409912 24.17293 63.10421 0.000000
2 4.899419 4.103462 17.24114 28.20169 45.55250 0.001793
5 6.346459 13.99371 30.70778 29.85724  18.80392  0.290894
 10 6.972812 17.38285 35.87180 26.56812  12.81692  0.387495
 15  6.870065  18.30520  36.42290  26.39263  11.71942  0.289782
 20  6.759464  18.03084  35.77163  27.05073  12.04099  0.346344
 30  6.693095  18.03734  35.58399  27.46139  11.93215  0.292028
LEMT 1  0.210306  0.367841  1.387165  3.424471  1.835884  92.77433
 2  0.101980  1.117218  1.799642  1.712019  3.057500  92.21164
 5  0.033415  3.787049  2.875262  0.449618  8.361207  84.49345
 10  0.120244  5.967603  5.052392  2.357496  10.42625  76.07601
 15  0.129891  5.695530  4.695365  1.917413  10.09606  77.46574
 20  0.119926  5.166689  3.947283  2.451724  10.78448  77.52990
 30  0.091342  5.057836  3.739682  2.321750  10.76534  78.02405
 Variance
Decomposition
of:
Cholesky Ordering: LGDP R OF2 LEXC LCPI LEMT
Period LGDP R OF LEXC LCPI LEMT
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The response of exchange rate due to shock to trade openness is positive. A one standard
error shock to trade openness will lead to a depreciation of rupiah exchange rate. As the
Indonesian economy is more open, there use of foreign reserve to cover current account deficit,
can lead to the depreciation of rupiah exchange rate. In additions, shock to trade openness will
lead to increase the inflation, while a one standard error shock to trade openness does not
have any real effect to labor force.
Figure III.6. Impulse Response Function of Trade Openness
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The movement of each macroeconomic variable due to shocks to financial openness is
various (Figure III.7). Output becomes to be lower due to a shock to financial openness. In
additions to the result, a one standard error shock to financial openness will lead to an increase
in interest rate in the very short run, however in the long run it will lead a decrease in the
interest rate. This result may be robust since Indonesian financial market has become integrated
to world financial market, domestic interest rate will decrease approaching to world interest
rate, and while in the short run the market needs time to adjust to a high interest rate.
Figure III.7. Impulse Response Function of Financial Openness
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The movement of exchange rate, inflation, and labor force due to the shock to financial
openness is relatively various; shock to financial openness leads to the increase of exchange
rate, inflation, and labor force.
VI. Conclusions
There are long disputes about the relationship between the degree of openness and
economic performance. Based on cross country analysis, the findings of studies on the relationship
between openness and economic performance are various.  Some studies found a positive
relationship between openness and economic performance, while the others found a negative
impact on the relationship.
Instead of using cross-section data like previous studies, this study uses structural vector
autoregression (SVAR) to explore the impact of openness to Indonesian economy. The findings
show that trade openness and financial openness have a negative impact on output. The
result of trade openness may be robust since lack of preparation to anticipate trade openness
lead to the weakening of competitiveness of Indonesian product relative to foreign product
and finally lower output. The result of financial openness also is robust since  the more financial
openness leads Indonesian economy to be more vulnerable to capital reversal, which then to
lower output.
The findings of forecast error variance decomposition analysis for trade openness model
show that fluctuations in the output, exchange rate, and inflation in the very short-run and
long-run are significantly explained by trade openness. The long-run financial openness model
finds that the fluctuations in the rupiah exchange rate, and inflation are significantly explained
by financial openness but it is not significant in the long run, while the fluctuation in the labor
force is significantly explained by financial openness in the long run but it is not in the very
short run.
The variance decomposition analysis on financial openness found that variability of each
macroeconomics variable was mostly able to explain the fluctuation of financial openness.
Fluctuation in output, interest rate, rupiah exchange rate, and inflation are also significantly
explained by financial openness.
The findings of impulse response analysis show that shocks to trade openness will lead to
lower output in the short run and long run; however the effect in the long run is bigger than in
the short run. Shocks to trade openness relatively have no effect to labor force, while rupiah
exchange rate and inflation will be higher due to shocks to trade openness.
250 Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan, Januari 2008
The movement of each macroeconomic variable due to a shock to financial openness is
mixed. A shock to financial openness will lead to lower output, but on the contrary it will lead
to increase employment. In additions, a shock to financial openness leads to an increase in
interest rate in the very short run but it lower interest rate in the long run. The finding may be
robust since the preparation to adopt financial integration lead to increase interest rate in the
very short run; however in the long run domestic interest rate decline approaching to world
interest rate.
Since findings show that openness leads to lower output, the Government should be
well prepared before liberalizing international trade and domestic financial market in line with
world financial market. Failure to prepare openness leads to lowering competitiveness of
Indonesia»s goods and services, and finally will jeopardize the output.
This paper uses ratio between trade total and GDP to measure trade openness and
ratio between total of capital inflow and GDP to measure financial openness. These indicators
may have weakening, thus further research using other measurement of openness could give
better findings on the relationship between openness and economic performance.
251The Openness and Its Impact to Indonesian Economy: A Structural VAR Approach
REFFERENCES
Bank Indonesia (2003), ≈Storyline Sejarah Bank Indonesia (Bank Indonesia»s History),∆ Mimeo,
Ban Indonesia.
Bank Indonesia (2004), ≈Globalisasi Keuangan dan Dampaknya  Terhadap Stabilitas Nilai Tukar
Rupiah (Financial Globalization and Its Impact to Rupiah Exchange Rate Stability),∆ DKM-
Bank Indonesia Occasional Paper No. OP/04/07.
Bear, D. V. T. (1966), ≈A Note on Measuring the Openness of An Economy,∆ The Review of
Economics and Statistics, Vol. 48, No. 1, pp. 100-101.
Beenstock, Michael and Peter Warburton (1983), ≈Long-Term Trends in Economic Openness in
the United Kingdom and the United States,∆ Oxford Economic Papers, New Series, Vol. 35,
No. 1, pp. 130-135.
Bhagwati, Jagdish and T.N. Srinivasan (2002), ≈Trade and Poverty in the Poor Countries,∆ The
American Economic Review, Vol. 92, No. 2, pp. 180-183.
Binhadi (1995), Financial Sector Deregulation, Banking Development and Monetary Policy: The
Indonesian Experience, Institute Bankir Indonesia.
Blanchard, Oliver Jean and Danny Quah (1989), ≈The Dynamic Effects of Aggregate Demand
and Supply Disturbances,∆ The American Economic Reviews, Vol. 79, No. 4, pp. 655-673.
Diamond, Douglas and Philip Dybvig (1983),Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity,∆ Journal
of Political Economy 91, 401-419.
Djibvre, Joseph and Sigal Ribon (2003), ≈Inflation, Unemployment, The Exchange Rate, and
Monetary Policy in Israel, 1990-99: SVAR Approach,∆ Israel Economic Review 2, 71-99.
Edwards, Sebastian (1993), ≈Openness, Trade Liberalization, and Growth in Developing
Countries,∆ Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 1358-1393.
Edwards, Sebastian (1998), ≈Openness, Productivity and Growth: What do We Really Know?∆
The Economic Journal, Vol. 108, No. 477, pp. 3838-398.
Fischer, Stanley (2003), ≈Globalization and Its Challenges,∆ The American Economic Review,
Vol. 93, No. 2, pp. 1-30.
252 Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan, Januari 2008
Gilis, Malcom, and David Dapice (1988), Indonesia, in The Open Economy: Tools for Policy
Makers in Developing Countries, edited by Rudiger Dornbusch and F. Leslie C. H. Helmers,
EDI Series in Economic Development.
Hau, Harald (2002), ≈Real Exchange Rate Volatility and Economic Openness: Theory and
Evidence,∆ Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 34, No. 3, Part 1, pp. 611-630.
Jackson, Karl D. (1999), Asian Contagion: The Causes and Consequences of a Financial Crisis,
Westview Press.
Levine, Ross (1997), ≈Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda,∆ Journal
of Economic Literature, Vol. 35, No. 2, pp. 688-726.
Martin, Christian W, Thomas Plumper, and Gerald Schneider (2001), ≈Economic Openness in
Developing Countries: An Empirical Investigation using CACAO,∆ Mimeo, University of
Konstanz.
Monfort A. and R. Rabemananjara (1990), ≈From a VAR model to a Structural Model, with an
Application to the Wage-Price Spiral,∆ Journal of Applied Econometrics, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp.
203-227.
Montes, M. (1998), The Currency Crisis in Southeast Asia, Institute of Southeast Asia, Singapore.
Nasution, Anwar, Wing Thye Woo, and Bruce Glassburner (1994), Macroeconomics Policies,
Crises, and Long-Term Growth in Indonesia, 1965-90, The World Bank.
Pernia, Ernesto M. and Pilipinas F. Quising (2003), ≈Economic Openness and Regional
Development in the Philippines,∆ ERD Working Paper Series, No. 34, Asian Development
Bank.
Radelet, S. and J. Sachs (1998), ≈The East Asian Financial Crisis: Diagnosis, Remedies, Prospects,∆
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity.
Romer, David (1993), ≈Openness and Inflation: Theory and Evidence,∆ The Quaterly Journal of
Economics, Vol. 108, No. 4, pp. 869-903.
Simorangkir, Iskandar, Hermanto Siregar, and Iman Sugema (2006), ≈Paradox Between Economic
Growth and Unemployment in Indonesia, PPSK-Bank Indonesia Working Paper.
Sims, Christopher A. (1980), ≈Macroeconomics and Reality,∆ Econometrica, Vol. 48, No. 1, pp.
1-48.
Sims, Christopher A. (1996), ≈Macroeconomics and Methodology,∆ The Journal of Economic
Perspectives, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 105-120.
253The Openness and Its Impact to Indonesian Economy: A Structural VAR Approach
Siregar, H. Ward and B.D. Ward, ≈Long Run Money Demand, Long Run Spending Balance and
Macro-Economic Fluctuations: Application of a Cointegrating SVAR Model to the Indonesian
Macroeconomy,∆ Mimeo, IPB.
Solikin (2004), ≈Fluktuasi Makroekonomi dan Respons Kebijakan Moneter yang Optimal di
Indonesia (Macroeconomic Fluctuation and the Optimal Response of Monetary Policy),∆
Center for Central Banking Education and Studies (PPSK) Working Paper, Bank Indonesia.
Terra, Cristina T. (1998), ≈Openness and Inflation: A New Assessment,∆ The Quaterly Journal of
Economics, Vol. 113, No. 2, pp. 641-648.
Weinhold, Diana and James E. Rauch (1999), ≈Openness, Specialization, and Productivity
Gorowth in Less Developed Countries,∆ The Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 32, No. 4,
pp. 1009-1027.
Whitman, Marina V. N. (1969), ≈Economic Openness and International Financial Flows,∆ Journal
of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 727-749.
World Bank (2004, 2005, 2006), Global Development Finance, The World Bank.
254 Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan, Januari 2008
APPENDIX III.1: Unit Root Test
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 0.9587 0.0140
Interest rate (R) 0.0034 0.0000
Trade Openness (OT) 0.3103 0.0000
Financial Openness (OF) 0.4259 0.0000
Exchange Rate (EXC) 0.9411 0.0001
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 0.9627 0.0006
Labor Force (EMT) 0.2176 0.0368
First Difference (P-Value)Level (P-Value)Variables
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APPENDIX III.2: Cointegration Test
Trade Openness
None *  0.417854  132.1138  95.75366  0.0000
At most 1 *  0.328919  79.09243  69.81889  0.0076
At most 2  0.171223  40.00359  47.85613  0.2224
t most 3  0.096026  21.59884  29.79707  0.3214
At most 4  0.077019  11.70523  15.49471  0.1716
At most 5  0.038533  3.850906  3.841466  0.0597
Hypothesized
No. of CE(s)
Eigenvalue
Trace
Statistic
0.05
Critical Value
Prob.**
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)
Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values
Date: 11/03/06   Time: 14:09
Sample (adjusted): 1981Q1 2005Q2
Included observations: 98 after adjustments
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend
Series: LGDP R OT LEXC LCPI LEMTΩ
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 3
None *  0.417854  53.02137  40.07757  0.0010
At most 1 *  0.328919  39.08884  33.87687  0.0109
At most 2  0.171223  18.40475  27.58434  0.4618
At most 3  0.096026  9.893613  21.13162  0.7546
At most 4  0.077019  7.854320  14.26460  0.3937
At most 5  0.038533  3.850906  3.841466  0.0597
Hypothesized
No. of CE(s)
Eigenvalue
Max-Eigen
Statistic
0.05
Critical Value
Prob.**
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values
Unrestricted Cointegrating Coefficients (normalized by b»*S11*b=I):Ω
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Financial Openness
Date: 11/03/06   Time: 15:35
Sample (adjusted): 1981Q2 2005Q2
Included observations: 97 after adjustments
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend
Series: LGDP R OF2 LEXC LCPI LEMTΩ
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 4
None *  0.413398  126.4718  95.75366  0.0001
At most 1 *  0.310011  74.73115  69.81889  0.0192
At most 2  0.152543  38.73642  47.85613  0.2709
At most 3  0.114416  22.68145  29.79707  0.2620
At most 4  0.064675  10.89518  15.49471  0.2180
At most 5  0.044442  4.409641  3.841466  0.0557
Hypothesized
No. of CE(s)
Eigenvalue
Trace
Statistic
0.05
Critical Value
Prob.**
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)
 Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values
None *  0.413398  51.74060  40.07757  0.0016
At most 1 *  0.310011  35.99473  33.87687  0.0275
At most 2  0.152543  16.05496  27.58434  0.6611
At most 3  0.114416  11.78628  21.13162  0.5689
At most 4  0.064675  6.485538  14.26460  0.5517
At most 5  0.044442  4.409641  3.841466  0.0557
Hypothesized
No. of CE(s)
Eigenvalue
Max-Eigen
Statistic
0.05
Critical Value
Prob.**
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values
Unrestricted Cointegrating Coefficients (normalized by b»*S11*b=I):Ω
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APPENDIX III.3: Vector Error Correction Estimate
Trade Openness
Vector Error Correction Estimates
Date: 11/03/06   Time: 15:53
Sample (adjusted): 1980Q4 2005Q2
Included observations: 99 after adjustments
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]
LGDP  1.000000
R -0.140732
 (0.01804)
[-7.80132]
OT -0.047576
 (0.00826)
[-5.75962]
LEXC  0.000000
LCPI  0.000000
LEMT -1.000000
C  11.67159
Cointegrating Eq:
Cointegration Restrictions:
B (1,1)=1, B(1,4)=0, B(1,5)=0, B(1,6)=-1
Convergence achieved after 56 iterations.
Restrictions identify all cointegrating vectors
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 1):
Chi-square(3)  2.773125
Probability  0.427943
CointEq1
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Financial Openness
Vector Error Correction Estimates
Date: 09/09/05   Time: 22:54
Sample (adjusted): 1980Q4 2005Q2
Included observations: 99 after adjustments
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]
LGDP  1.000000
R -0.054535
 (0.01272)
[-4.28681]
OF2 -0.057083
 (0.00944)
[-6.04446]
LEXC  0.000000
LCPI  0.000000
LEMT -1.000000
C  7.894010
Cointegrating Eq:
Cointegration Restrictions:
B(1,1)=1, B(1,4)=0, B(1,5)=0, B(1,6)=-1
Convergence achieved after 50 iterations.
Restrictions identify all cointegrating vectors
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 1):
Chi-square(3)  9.249486
Probability  0.026151
CointEq1
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APPENDIX III.4: Variance Decomposition
Variance Decomposition of Trade Openness
LGDP 1 100 0 0 0 0 0
2 89.13915 0.125681 7.656387 2.165048 0.913731 5.77E-07
5 68.75486 3.338833 21.79006 4.984646 0.445243 0.686352
10 60.53328 3.918815 27.79061 6.304005 0.343535 1.10975
15 58.87557 4.222794 29.32911 6.313865 0.445247 0.813418
20 58.05234 4.229643 29.99894 6.402928 0.399998 0.916155
30 57.14194 4.351058 30.82253 6.475786 0.409104 0.799578
R 1 0.969171 99.03083 0 0 0 0
2 2.063623 72.98599 7.636848 3.984519 13.32893 8.88E-05
5 5.470561 42.65912 19.34319 22.41984 10.06885 0.038446
10 5.148787 42.0328 20.81674 22.79906 8.938771 0.263841
15 4.553728 37.55038 26.96147 20.16298 10.04908 0.722363
20 4.200486 34.88017 29.34558 18.79047 12.0329 0.750386
30 3.661608 31.18961 33.56498 16.64012 14.11192 0.831777
EXC 1 2.361867 0.398958 23.94036 73.29881 0 0
2 1.913719 3.929531 30.35425 62.24583 1.503911 0.05276
5 1.523535 4.410526 36.74859 52.91455 4.006362 0.396441
10 1.169557 3.867829 37.70815 50.5498 6.397754 0.30691
15 1.056306 3.681232 38.11233 49.69221 7.183974 0.273948
20 0.989876 3.536421 38.34769 49.40173 7.480835 0.243446
30 0.920768 3.429793 38.63113 48.90189 7.926146 0.190279
CPI 1 2.112499 1.38519 6.088852 26.31832 64.09514 0
2 3.706483 5.747416 14.65941 30.7642 45.11099 0.011499
5 3.832179 12.87011 33.18317 33.30301 16.36771 0.44382
10 3.851909 13.94733 38.16998 33.24811 10.12359 0.65908
15 3.830773 14.32256 39.0281 33.505 8.849145 0.464418
20 3.839427 14.25963 39.22387 33.62934 8.525388 0.522338
30 3.8348 14.38141 39.6245 33.76965 7.955344 0.434303
EMT 1 0.109493 0.204852 1.215421 4.189655 1.625303 92.65528
2 0.037523 0.826932 1.483313 2.749411 2.799216 92.10361
5 0.020259 2.903353 1.672846 0.703945 6.874118 87.82548
10 0.014783 4.250042 1.717801 0.517853 8.733767 84.76576
15 0.016192 3.901674 1.65913 0.473672 8.380868 85.56846
20 0.013265 4.100991 1.623792 0.364334 8.733967 85.16365
30 0.011158 4.064703 1.608115 0.277599 8.743934 85.29449
 Variance
Decomposition
of:
Cholesky Ordering: LGDP R OT LEXC LCPI LEMT
Period LGDP R OT LEXC LCPI LEMT
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Variance Decomposition of Financial Openness
LGDP 1  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000
 2  90.69095  0.075317  3.477025  4.604805  1.145645  0.006256
 5 77.83611  4.688831  11.35672  5.116329  0.564998  0.437004
 10  70.29557  6.627112  16.25115  5.814556  0.371245  0.640371
 15  70.18959  7.055152  16.59247  5.421685  0.261891  0.479214
 20  70.98741  6.788930  16.06373  5.374820  0.224685  0.560423
 30  71.45105  6.718453  15.88139  5.288157  0.166083  0.494873
 1  2.023815  97.97618  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000
 2  2.687487  79.98477  1.157284  7.994857  8.168476  0.007131
 5  6.024084  60.10363 10.63125  16.69003  6.483755  0.067263
 10  4.787561  64.54075  9.829894  15.59783  5.040198  0.203762
 15  4.410863  57.23791  19.65841  13.64419  4.775451  0.273178
 20  3.933702  52.74125  24.39246  13.11731  5.237970  0.577308
 30  3.125710  51.83270  25.64836  13.18419  5.562858  0.646187
LEXC 1  3.035198  0.001578  31.51974  65.44349  0.000000  0.000000
 2  2.794692  5.642360  31.44907  59.40011  0.690835  0.022938
 5 2.984107  9.667359  33.39381  49.98918  3.636139  0.329404
 10  2.953780  10.84930  36.71570  43.93518  5.245320  0.300724
 15  3.018939  11.55739  38.13217  41.18382  5.860080  0.247591
 20  2.984563  11.66800  38.42179  40.58459  6.133459  0.207597
 21  2.975342  11.69734  38.47224  40.42699  6.224097  0.203991
 30  2.972858  11.84015 38.90593  39.63175  6.496176  0.153146
LCPI 1  2.728679  0.584271  9.409912 24.17293  63.10421  0.000000
 2  4.899419  4.103462  17.24114  28.20169  45.55250  0.001793
 5  6.346459  13.99371  30.70778  29.85724  18.80392  0.290894
 10  6.972812  17.38285  35.87180  26.56812  12.81692  0.387495
 15 6.870065  18.30520  36.42290  26.39263  11.71942  0.289782
 20  6.759464  18.03084  35.77163  27.05073  12.04099  0.346344
 30  6.693095  18.03734  35.58399  27.46139  11.93215  0.292028
LEMT  1  0.210306  0.367841  1.387165  3.424471  1.835884  92.77433
 2  0.101980  1.117218  1.799642  1.712019  3.057500  92.21164
 5  0.033415  3.787049  2.875262  0.449618  8.361207  84.49345
 10  0.120244  5.967603  5.052392  2.357496  10.42625  76.07601
 15  0.129891  5.695530  4.695365  1.917413  10.09606  77.46574
 20  0.119926  5.166689  3.947283  2.451724  10.78448  77.52990
 30 0.091342  5.057836  3.739682  2.321750  10.76534  78.02405
 Variance
Decomposition
of:
Cholesky Ordering : LGDP R OF2 LEXC LCPI LEMT
Period LGDP R OF LEXC LCPI LEMT
